Arbeitspapier

Human Capital Investment and Globalization in Extortionary States

This paper considers education investment and public education subsidies in closed and open economies with an extortionary government. The extortionary government in a closed economy has incentives to subsidize education in order to overcome a hold-up problem of time consistent taxation, similar to benevolent governments. The two types of government differ in their education policies if highly productive labor is fully mobile. Extortionary governments? incentives for education subsidies vanish and they even have an incentive to prevent individuals from mobility increasing education investment. Tax competition therefore reduces hold-up problems of time consistent extortionary taxation, but also introduces incentives that reduce workers? utility.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 239

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Thema
Globalization
commitment
time consistent income taxation
migration
education
Bildungsinvestition
Einkommensteuerpolitik
Bildungspolitik
Internationale Arbeitsmobilität
Steuerwettbewerb
Leviathan-Modell
Öffentliche Bildungsausgaben
Globalisierung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Andersson, Fredrik
Konrad, Kai A.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Andersson, Fredrik
  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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