Arbeitspapier
Human Capital Investment and Globalization in Extortionary States
This paper considers education investment and public education subsidies in closed and open economies with an extortionary government. The extortionary government in a closed economy has incentives to subsidize education in order to overcome a hold-up problem of time consistent taxation, similar to benevolent governments. The two types of government differ in their education policies if highly productive labor is fully mobile. Extortionary governments? incentives for education subsidies vanish and they even have an incentive to prevent individuals from mobility increasing education investment. Tax competition therefore reduces hold-up problems of time consistent extortionary taxation, but also introduces incentives that reduce workers? utility.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 239
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Thema
-
Globalization
commitment
time consistent income taxation
migration
education
Bildungsinvestition
Einkommensteuerpolitik
Bildungspolitik
Internationale Arbeitsmobilität
Steuerwettbewerb
Leviathan-Modell
Öffentliche Bildungsausgaben
Globalisierung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Andersson, Fredrik
Konrad, Kai A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Andersson, Fredrik
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2001