Arbeitspapier

Human capital investment and globalization in extortionary states

This paper considers education investment and public education policy in closed and open economies with an extortionary government. The extortionary government in a closed economy chooses an education policy in order to overcome a hold-up problem of time-consistent taxation similar to benevolent governments. The two types of government differ in their education policies if highly productive labor is mobile. Extortionary governments. incentives for a policy that stimulates higher private education efforts vanish; instead they have incentives to prevent individuals from mobility-increasing education investment. Tax competition therefore reduces hold-up problems of time-consistent extortionary taxation, but introduces other distortions that reduce workers. utility.

Alternative title
Humankapitalinvestitionen und Globalisierung in Ausbeutungsstaaten
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 02-01

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Subject
Migration
education
globalization
commitment
time consistent income taxation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Andersson, Fredrik
Konrad, Kai A.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Andersson, Fredrik
  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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