Arbeitspapier
Everyday econometricians: Selection neglect and overoptimism when learning from others
In this paper, we design an investment game which allows us to study the influence of selection when learning from others. Using the theoretical study of selection neglect in Jehiel (2018) as a guide, we test (i) for the presence of selection neglect in this investment context, and (ii) some comparative static predictions of the model. We find strong evidence for selection neglect—even though subjects are fully informed about the data generating process. As theoretically predicted, the degree of bias due to selection neglect increases when other decision makers become more informed, or become more rational. It decreases when signals are correlated.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2019-301
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bayesian Analysis: General
Design of Experiments: General
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Subject
-
selection neglect
beliefs
overconfidence
experiment
survivorship bias
bounded rationality
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Barron, Kai
Huck, Steffen
Jehiel, Philippe
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (when)
-
2019
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Barron, Kai
- Huck, Steffen
- Jehiel, Philippe
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Time of origin
- 2019
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