Arbeitspapier
Institutionalizing Eurozone exit: A modified NEWNEY approach
In this note, we argue that the Eurozone needs an institutional exit mechanism to enhance Eurozone stability, and propose modifications to the Dobbs' NEWNEY mechanism, the only mechanism that satisfies the twin properties of eliminating incentives for intra-Eurozone capital flight and maintaining Eurozone price stability. Our modifications eliminate moral hazard, allow for a fair distribution of costs (between and within countries) and are also appropriate for the exit of a fiscally strong country.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4116
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Monetary Policy
- Subject
-
Eurozone
Eurozone exit
price stability
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Huck, Steffen
Valasek, Justin Mattias
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2013
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Huck, Steffen
- Valasek, Justin Mattias
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2013
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