Arbeitspapier
Absent-minded drivers in the lab: Testing Gilboa's model
This note contributes to the discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall from an empirical point of view. We argue that, using standard methods of experimental economics, it is impossible to induce (or control for) absent-mindedness of subjects. Nevertheless, it is possible to test Gilboa's (1997) agent-based approach to games with imperfect recall. We implement his model of the absent-minded driver problem in an experiment and find, if subjects are repeatedly randomly rematched, strong support for the equilibrium prediction which coincides with Piccione and Rubinstein's (1997) ex ante solution of the driver's problem.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2000,45
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Thema
-
experiments
imperfect recall
the absent-minded driver's paradox
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Huck, Steffen
Müller, Wieland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047574
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Huck, Steffen
- Müller, Wieland
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Entstanden
- 2000