Arbeitspapier

Absent-minded drivers in the lab: Testing Gilboa's model

This note contributes to the discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall from an empirical point of view. We argue that, using standard methods of experimental economics, it is impossible to induce (or control for) absent-mindedness of subjects. Nevertheless, it is possible to test Gilboa's (1997) agent-based approach to games with imperfect recall. We implement his model of the absent-minded driver problem in an experiment and find, if subjects are repeatedly randomly rematched, strong support for the equilibrium prediction which coincides with Piccione and Rubinstein's (1997) ex ante solution of the driver's problem.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2000,45

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Thema
experiments
imperfect recall
the absent-minded driver's paradox

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Huck, Steffen
Müller, Wieland
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2000

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047574
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Huck, Steffen
  • Müller, Wieland
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Entstanden

  • 2000

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