Complementary Patents and Market Structure

Arbeitspapier

Many high technology goods are based on standards that require access to several patents that are owned by different IP holders. We investigate the royalties chosen by IP holders under different market structures. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders (or a patent pool) solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always encourages entry and innovation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 249

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives ; Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; Property Law

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Schmidt, Klaus M.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13303
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94124
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13303-2
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ