Implementing efficient market structure

Arbeitspapier

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2000,19

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Rationing; Licensing ; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
• Subject: auctions ; mechanism design ; natural oligopoly ; entry

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Grimm, Veronika ; Riedel, Frank ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2000

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62258
• URN: urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047235