Arbeitspapier

Complementary Patents and Market Structure

Many high technology goods are based on standards that require several essential patents owned by different IP holders. This gives rise to a complements and a double mark-up problem. We compare the welfare effects of two different business strategies dealing with these problems. Vertical integration of an IP holder and a downstream producer solves the double mark-up problem between these firms. Nevertheless, it may raise royalty rates and reduce output as compared to non-integration. Horizontal integration of IP holders solves the complements problem but not the double mark-up problem. Vertical integration discourages entry and reduces innovation incentives, while horizontal integration always benefits from entry and innovation

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 274

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schmidt, Klaus M.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2009

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13279
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13279-2
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schmidt, Klaus M.
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2009

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