Arbeitspapier
Who gains from tariff escalation?
With the help of a simple model of production and trade, we examine the differential impact of tariff escalation on skilled and unskilled wages in an economy. Our findings provide a lobbying-based explanation of the prevalence of tariff escalation in developed countries. It also predicts the possible response of a developing country and shows how similar lobbying activity in that country can slow the pace of liberalization of service sector trade.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: WIDER Discussion Paper ; No. 2003/62
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Global Outlook
Neoclassical Models of Trade
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- Thema
-
escalation
tariff
lobby
developing country
WTO
Zolltheorie
Protektionismus
Interessenpolitik
Entwicklungsländer
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
- (wo)
-
Helsinki
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb
- The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
Entstanden
- 2003
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