Arbeitspapier
Public and private management of renewable resources: Who gains, who loses?
Renewable resources provide society with resource rent and surpluses for resource users (the processing industry, consumers) and owners of production factors (capital and labor employed in resource harvesting). We show that resource users and factor owners may favor inefficiently high harvest rates up to open-access levels. This may explain why public resource management is often very inefficient. We further show that privatizing inefficiently managed resources would cause losses for resource users and factor owners, unless (a) the stock is severely depleted and (b) the discount rate is low. We quantify our results for the Northeast Arctic Cod fishery
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Economics Working Paper ; No. 2012-02 [rev.]
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Factor Income Distribution
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services; Biodiversity Conservation; Bioeconomics; Industrial Ecology
- Thema
-
resource rent
consumer surplus
worker surplus
distribution
political economy
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Quaas, Martin F.
Stoeven, Max T.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Quaas, Martin F.
- Stoeven, Max T.
- Kiel University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2013