Konferenzbeitrag

Competition for access provision: Infrastructure upgrades with spillovers

We examine a game of competition with access provision in which service quality is endogenously determined through infrastructure upgrades with spillovers. There are two types of equilibria in the free competition regime. In particular, voluntary access provision with an access charge higher than access cost occurs in equilibrium, irrespective of the degree of spillover and the investment cost. However, foreclosure also occurs in equilibrium when the degree of spillover is small and the investment cost is low. We also show that, when voluntary access provision occurs in equilibrium, access regulation is socially desirable only if the degree of spillover is small and the investment cost is high. On the contrary, access regulation is socially desirable in the broader range of investment cost under foreclosure than under voluntary access provision.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: 25th European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Disruptive Innovation in the ICT Industries: Challenges for European Policy and Business" , Brussels, Belgium, 22nd-25th June, 2014

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Economics of Regulation
Telecommunications
Thema
access provision
infrastructure upgrades
foreclosure

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Matsushima, Noriaki
Mizuno, Keizo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
(wo)
Calgary
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Beteiligte

  • Matsushima, Noriaki
  • Mizuno, Keizo
  • International Telecommunications Society (ITS)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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