Arbeitspapier

Strategic Location Choice under Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition and Spillovers

This paper investigates firms' optimal location choices explicitly accounting for the role of inwards and outwards knowledge spillovers in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly with firms that are heterogeneous in their ability to carry out cost-reducing R\&D. Firms can either locate in an industrial cluster or in isolation. Technological spillovers are exchanged between the firms in the cluster. It is shown that a technological leader has an incentive to locate in isolation only if her advantage exceeds a certain threshold, which is increasing in firms' discount rate, in industry dispersion, and in the intensity of knowledge spillovers. Scenarios are identified where although it is optimal for the technological leader to locate in isolation, from a welfare perspective it would be desirable that she locates in the cluster.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity
Thema
Location Choice
Knowledge Spillovers
Technological Leadership
Markov-perfect Equilibrium

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Colombo, Luca
Dawid, Herbert
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Colombo, Luca
  • Dawid, Herbert
  • Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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