Arbeitspapier
Strategic Location Choice under Dynamic Oligopolistic Competition and Spillovers
This paper investigates firms' optimal location choices explicitly accounting for the role of inwards and outwards knowledge spillovers in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly with firms that are heterogeneous in their ability to carry out cost-reducing R\&D. Firms can either locate in an industrial cluster or in isolation. Technological spillovers are exchanged between the firms in the cluster. It is shown that a technological leader has an incentive to locate in isolation only if her advantage exceeds a certain threshold, which is increasing in firms' discount rate, in industry dispersion, and in the intensity of knowledge spillovers. Scenarios are identified where although it is optimal for the technological leader to locate in isolation, from a welfare perspective it would be desirable that she locates in the cluster.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity
- Thema
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Location Choice
Knowledge Spillovers
Technological Leadership
Markov-perfect Equilibrium
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Colombo, Luca
Dawid, Herbert
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Colombo, Luca
- Dawid, Herbert
- Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
Entstanden
- 2013