Arbeitspapier

Public Provision and Local Income Tax Competition

We extend the literature on local income tax competition by allowing for inter-jurisdictional spillovers and imperfect rivalry in consumption of a publicly provided good. Comparing decentralized second-best results of a theoretical model with an efficient benchmark, we identify three inefficiencies: (1) imperfect redistribution; (2) inter-community free-riding; and (3) an inefficient allocation of the population. We quantify the relative size of these inefficiencies in a numerical implementation of the theoretical model, which reveals that free-riding rises unambiguously in the level of spillovers, whereas the welfare losses from (1) and (3) depend nonlinearly on the levels of spillovers and rivalry.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5789

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Subject
publicly provided goods
tax competition
fiscal federalism
decentralization
free-riding
welfare analysis

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kuhlmey, Florian
Hintermann, Beat
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kuhlmey, Florian
  • Hintermann, Beat
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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