Cross-listing, managerial compensation and corporate governance

Artikel

This study examines the relationship between cross-listing and managerial compensation of Chinese firms that concurrently issued A- and B-shares or A- and H-shares during 2001 - 2010. The results show that executive compensation is a positive factor to motivate Chinese A-share firms to cross-list as B- or H-shares; it implies that cross-listings could be employed as a way of asset appropriation at the managers' discretion. The results also confirm that corporate governance is important in determining cross-listings. Under the weak corporate governance institution, Chinese firms were chosen to cross-list based on political considerations rather than on economic merits, serving as a vehicle to signal the quality of state owned enterprises. The results are drawn on agency theory, signalling hypothesis and bonding hypothesis.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Cogent Economics & Finance ; ISSN: 2332-2039 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-17 ; Abingdon: Taylor & Francis

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Financial Markets ; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill ; Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
• Subject: cross-listing ; executive compensation ; corporate governance ; China

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Luo, Yongli
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Taylor & Francis
• (where): Abingdon
• (when): 2014

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.1080/23322039.2014.967361
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147733
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET