Arbeitspapier
Financial structure, managerial compensation and monitoring
When a firm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential, managerial bonuses are shown to be an optimal solution. A small managerial bonus linked to firm's performance not only reduces moral hazard between managers and shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring shareholders. A negative relation between corporate bond yields and managerial bonuses can be predicted. Furthermore, the model shows how higher managerial pay-performance sensitivity goes hand in hand with greater company leverage and lower company diversification. These predictions find some support in the empirical literature.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series ; No. 207
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- Thema
-
Managerial Compensation
Financial Structure
Monitoring
Diversification
Corporate Governance
Aktionäre
Verbindlichkeiten
Management
Leistungsentgelt
Wirtschaftsmodell
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cerasi, Vittoria
Daltung, Sonja
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sveriges Riksbank
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cerasi, Vittoria
- Daltung, Sonja
- Sveriges Riksbank
Entstanden
- 2007