Arbeitspapier

Financial structure, managerial compensation and monitoring

When a firm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential, managerial bonuses are shown to be an optimal solution. A small managerial bonus linked to firm's performance not only reduces moral hazard between managers and shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring shareholders. A negative relation between corporate bond yields and managerial bonuses can be predicted. Furthermore, the model shows how higher managerial pay-performance sensitivity goes hand in hand with greater company leverage and lower company diversification. These predictions find some support in the empirical literature.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series ; No. 207

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Thema
Managerial Compensation
Financial Structure
Monitoring
Diversification
Corporate Governance
Aktionäre
Verbindlichkeiten
Management
Leistungsentgelt
Wirtschaftsmodell

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cerasi, Vittoria
Daltung, Sonja
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sveriges Riksbank
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cerasi, Vittoria
  • Daltung, Sonja
  • Sveriges Riksbank

Entstanden

  • 2007

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