Arbeitspapier
Merger and collusion in contests
Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. We show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable.
- Alternative title
-
Kollusion und Fusion in Contests
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 01-04
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Subject
-
Contests
merger
collusion
promotional competition
Kampf um Marktanteile
Kollusion
Fusion
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Huck, Steffen
Konrad, Kai A.
Müller, Wieland
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (when)
-
2001
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Huck, Steffen
- Konrad, Kai A.
- Müller, Wieland
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Time of origin
- 2001
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