- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Quantitative Economics ; ISSN: 1759-7331 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 203-254 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fox, Jeremy T.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Econometric Society
- (wo)
-
New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2010
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/QE3
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Fox, Jeremy T.
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2010
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