Arbeitspapier

Characterizing pairwise strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with money

We consider the problem of allocating a single object to the agents with payments. Agents have preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We characterize the class of rules satisfying pairwise strategy-proofness and non-imposition by the priority rule. Our characterization result remains valid even if we replace pairwise strategy-proofness by either weaker effectively pairwise strategy-proofness or stronger group strategy-proofness. By exploiting our characterization, we identify the class of rules satisfying both the properties that are in addition (i) onto, (ii) welfare continuous, (iii) minimally fair , (iv) constrained efficient within the class of rules satisfying both the properties, or (v) revenue undominated within the class of rules satisfying the properties, and find the tension between minimal properties of efficiency, fairness, and revenue maximization under pairwise strategy-proofness.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1187

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Market Design
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Pairwise strategy-proofness
Effectively pairwise strategy-proofness
Group strategy-proofness
Non-imposition
Efficiency
Fairness
Revenue maximization
Priority rules

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Shinozaki, Hiroki
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Shinozaki, Hiroki
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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