Arbeitspapier
Payoff Shares in Two-Player Contests
In contest models with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, these shares sum to less than one because a share of the value is lost due to rent-dissipation. We ask: can every such division into payoff shares arise as the outcome of the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a simple asymmetric contest in which contestants differ in the effectiveness of their efforts? For two-player contests the answer is shown to be positive.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: WWZ Discussion Paper ; No. 2014/11
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Subject
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Contests
Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
Rent-Dissipation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Häfner, Samuel
Nöldeke, Georg
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2014
- DOI
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doi:10.5451/unibas-ep61607
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Häfner, Samuel
- Nöldeke, Georg
- University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ)
Time of origin
- 2014
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Contests and negotiation between hubristic players
Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests
Strategic behavior of non-expected utility players in games with payoff uncertainty
Payoff shares in two-player contests
Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests
Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Optimal accuracy of unbiased Tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
Optimal accuracy of unbiased tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Accuracy in contests: Players' perspective
Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players
Player strength and effort in contests
Contests and negotiation between hubristic players
Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests