Artikel
Payoff shares in two-player contests
In imperfectly discriminating contests with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In contrast to a bargaining situation, players' shares sum to less than one because a residual share of the value is lost due to rent dissipation. In this paper, we consider contests with two players and investigate the relationship between these equilibrium shares and the parameters of a class of asymmetric Tullock contest success functions. Our main finding is that any players' shares that sum up to less than one can arise as the unique outcome of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for appropriate parameters.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 7 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-7 ; Basel: MDPI
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- Thema
-
contests
pure-strategy equilibrium
rent-dissipation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Häfner, Samuel
Nöldeke, Georg
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
MDPI
- (wo)
-
Basel
- (wann)
-
2016
- DOI
-
doi:10.3390/g7030025
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Häfner, Samuel
- Nöldeke, Georg
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2016
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Payoff Shares in Two-Player Contests
Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests
Accuracy in contests: Players' perspective
Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Optimal accuracy of unbiased Tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Optimal accuracy of unbiased tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players
Player strength and effort in contests
Contests and negotiation between hubristic players
Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests
Strategic behavior of non-expected utility players in games with payoff uncertainty
Payoff Shares in Two-Player Contests
Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests
Accuracy in contests: Players' perspective
Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Optimal accuracy of unbiased Tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Optimal accuracy of unbiased tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players
Player strength and effort in contests
Contests and negotiation between hubristic players
Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests
Strategic behavior of non-expected utility players in games with payoff uncertainty
Payoff Shares in Two-Player Contests
Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests
Accuracy in contests: Players' perspective
Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Optimal accuracy of unbiased Tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players
Optimal accuracy of unbiased tullock contests with two heterogeneous players
Revenue ranking of optimally biased contests: The case of two players
Player strength and effort in contests
Contests and negotiation between hubristic players
Distributional preferences in probabilistic and share contests