Arbeitspapier

Contests and negotiation between hubristic players

Why do contests exist in settings where negotiation provides a costless alternative? I assess a new explanation: parties may be overconfident about their ability or optimistic about their chances of winning. For both parties in a contest, this hubris: (i) reduces the incentive to exit the contest; (ii) reduces effort; and(iii) increases expected payoffs. Whilst hubris leads to the contest being preferred to costless negotiation, the welfare loss is nonmonotonic in either behavioural bias.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2019/17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Thema
Contests
Optimism bias
Overconfidence bias
Negotiation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Long, Iain W.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
(wo)
Cardiff
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Long, Iain W.
  • Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School

Entstanden

  • 2019

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