Dynamic reform of public institutions: a model of motivated agents and collective reputation
Abstract: State capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals with public-service motivation. However, when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both high and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the mission-oriented sector exist. Reforming a low-motivation institution requires a non-monotonic wage path: since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a highreputation institution, but positive for a low-reputation institution, a transition to a high-reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivated workers in, followed by a wage decrease to crowd non-motivated workers out
- Standort
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Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Umfang
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Online-Ressource, 40 S.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
Veröffentlichungsversion
begutachtet
- Erschienen in
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Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels ; Bd. SP II 2015-303r
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wo)
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Berlin
- (wann)
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2016
- Urheber
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Valasek, Justin
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-46218-v2-2
- Rechteinformation
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Open Access unbekannt; Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
25.03.2025, 13:41 MEZ
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Beteiligte
- Valasek, Justin
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Entstanden
- 2016
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