Arbeitspapier

Collective reputation, entry and minimum quality standard

This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2008,7

Classification
Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Public Goods
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
Subject
Collective Reputation
Entry
Minimum Quality Standard
Nahrungsmittelgewerbe
Prestige
Marktstruktur
Markteintritt
Produktqualität
Qualitätsmanagement
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Rouvière, Elodie
Soubeyran, Raphaël
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Rouvière, Elodie
  • Soubeyran, Raphaël
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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