Arbeitspapier
Collective reputation, entry and minimum quality standard
This article deals with the issue of entry into an industry where firms share a collective reputation. First, we show that free entry is not socially optimal; there is a need for regulation through the imposition of a minimum quality standard. Second, we argue that a minimum quality standard can induce firms to enter the market. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a minimum quality standard should not always be considered as a barrier to entry.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2008,7
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Public Goods
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
- Thema
-
Collective Reputation
Entry
Minimum Quality Standard
Nahrungsmittelgewerbe
Prestige
Marktstruktur
Markteintritt
Produktqualität
Qualitätsmanagement
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Rouvière, Elodie
Soubeyran, Raphaël
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Rouvière, Elodie
- Soubeyran, Raphaël
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2008
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