Arbeitspapier | Working paper

Dynamic reform of public institutions: a model of motivated agents and collective reputation

State capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals with public-service motivation. However, when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both high and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the mission-oriented sector exist. Reforming a low-motivation institution requires a non-monotonic wage path: since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a highreputation institution, but positive for a low-reputation institution, a transition to a high-reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivated workers in, followed by a wage decrease to crowd non-motivated workers out.

Urheber*in: Valasek, Justin

Free access - no reuse

Extent: Seite(n): 40

Language: Englisch

Notes: Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet

Bibliographic citation: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels (SP II 2015-303r)

Subject: Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie
Psychologie
angewandte Psychologie
Einkommenspolitik, Lohnpolitik, Tarifpolitik, Vermögenspolitik
Motivation
Effizienz
öffentliche Dienstleistung
Leistungsanreiz
öffentlicher Sektor
Reputation
Korruption
Lohn
Lohnerhöhung

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Valasek, Justin

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

(where): Deutschland, Berlin

(when): 2016

URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-46218-v2-2

Rights: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln

Last update: 21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST

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Arbeitspapier

Associated

Valasek, Justin
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Time of origin

2016

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Other Objects (12)

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