Arbeitspapier | Working paper
Dynamic reform of public institutions: a model of motivated agents and collective reputation
State capacity is optimized when public institutions are staffed by individuals with public-service motivation. However, when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both high and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the mission-oriented sector exist. Reforming a low-motivation institution requires a non-monotonic wage path: since the effect of higher wages on motivation is negative for a highreputation institution, but positive for a low-reputation institution, a transition to a high-reputation steady state requires an initial wage increase to crowd motivated workers in, followed by a wage decrease to crowd non-motivated workers out.
- Umfang
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Seite(n): 40
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Anmerkungen
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Status: Veröffentlichungsversion; begutachtet
- Erschienen in
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Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Ökonomik des Wandels (SP II 2015-303r)
- Thema
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Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie
Psychologie
angewandte Psychologie
Einkommenspolitik, Lohnpolitik, Tarifpolitik, Vermögenspolitik
Motivation
Effizienz
öffentliche Dienstleistung
Leistungsanreiz
öffentlicher Sektor
Reputation
Korruption
Lohn
Lohnerhöhung
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Valasek, Justin
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
- (wo)
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Deutschland, Berlin
- (wann)
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2016
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-46218-v2-2
- Rechteinformation
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GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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21.06.2024, 16:27 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Valasek, Justin
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
Entstanden
- 2016
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