Arbeitspapier
Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products
This paper studies optimal mechanisms for selling complementary goods sequentially. The seller starts with private information, has limited commitment and offers in the first period a menu of information structures on the value of the second-period product. Fully revealing the seller type in the first period makes the second period a standard adverse selection problem, and fully revealing the buyer type in the first period makes the second period an information design problem. Among properties of equilibria, all types of seller must pool in every equilibrium if certain first-order stochastic dominance and independence conditions are satisfied.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7394
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
information design
dynamic informed-principal problem
interdependent values
limited commitment
Myerson-Satterthwaite
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kwon, Suehyun
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
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Munich
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kwon, Suehyun
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2018