Arbeitspapier

Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products

This paper studies optimal mechanisms for selling complementary goods sequentially. The seller starts with private information, has limited commitment and offers in the first period a menu of information structures on the value of the second-period product. Fully revealing the seller type in the first period makes the second period a standard adverse selection problem, and fully revealing the buyer type in the first period makes the second period an information design problem. Among properties of equilibria, all types of seller must pool in every equilibrium if certain first-order stochastic dominance and independence conditions are satisfied.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7394

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
information design
dynamic informed-principal problem
interdependent values
limited commitment
Myerson-Satterthwaite

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kwon, Suehyun
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2018

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kwon, Suehyun
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2018

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