Arbeitspapier

Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products

This paper studies optimal mechanisms for selling complementary goods sequentially. The seller starts with private information, has limited commitment and offers in the first period a menu of information structures on the value of the second-period product. Fully revealing the seller type in the first period makes the second period a standard adverse selection problem, and fully revealing the buyer type in the first period makes the second period an information design problem. Among properties of equilibria, all types of seller must pool in every equilibrium if certain first-order stochastic dominance and independence conditions are satisfied.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7394

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
information design
dynamic informed-principal problem
interdependent values
limited commitment
Myerson-Satterthwaite

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kwon, Suehyun
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kwon, Suehyun
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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