Arbeitspapier
Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products
This paper studies optimal mechanisms for selling complementary goods sequentially. The seller starts with private information, has limited commitment and offers in the first period a menu of information structures on the value of the second-period product. Fully revealing the seller type in the first period makes the second period a standard adverse selection problem, and fully revealing the buyer type in the first period makes the second period an information design problem. Among properties of equilibria, all types of seller must pool in every equilibrium if certain first-order stochastic dominance and independence conditions are satisfied.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7394
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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information design
dynamic informed-principal problem
interdependent values
limited commitment
Myerson-Satterthwaite
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kwon, Suehyun
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2018
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kwon, Suehyun
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2018