Arbeitspapier
Optimal mechanism for selling two goods
We solve for the optimal mechanism for selling two goods when the buyer's demand characteristics are unobservable. In the case of substitutable goods, the seller has an incentive to offer lotteries over goods in order to charge the buyers with large differences in the valuations a higher price for obtaining their desired good with certainty. However, the seller also has a countervailing incentive to make the allocation of the goods among the participating buyers more efficient in order to increase the overall demand. In the case when the buyer can consume both goods, the seller has an incentive to underprovide one of the goods in order to charge the buyers with large valuations a higher price for the bundle of both goods. As in the case of substitutable goods, the seller also has a countervailing incentive to lower the price of the bundle in order to increase the overall demand.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Research Report ; No. 2010-3
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Monopoly
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- Thema
-
multidimensional screening
price discrimination
optimal selling strategies
mechanism design
Marktmechanismus
Verkauf
Preisdifferenzierung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pavlov, Gregory
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
London (Ontario)
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pavlov, Gregory
- The University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2010
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products
Price formation in a sequential selling mechanism
Optimal income taxation, public goods provision and robust mechanism design
Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment
Optimal refund mechanism
Optimal strategy for selling on group-buying website
Towards an optimal IPO mechanism
Essays in Optimal Mechanism Design
Optimal income taxation and public good provision in a two-class economy
Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy
Public-good provision, mechanism design and voting
Der Delphinverkäufer : Erfolgs-Selling statt Power-Selling
Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products
Price formation in a sequential selling mechanism
Optimal income taxation, public goods provision and robust mechanism design
Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment
Optimal refund mechanism
Optimal strategy for selling on group-buying website
Towards an optimal IPO mechanism
Essays in Optimal Mechanism Design
Optimal income taxation and public good provision in a two-class economy
Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy
Public-good provision, mechanism design and voting
Der Delphinverkäufer : Erfolgs-Selling statt Power-Selling
Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products
Price formation in a sequential selling mechanism
Optimal income taxation, public goods provision and robust mechanism design
Optimal selling mechanisms under imperfect commitment
Optimal refund mechanism
Optimal strategy for selling on group-buying website
Towards an optimal IPO mechanism
Essays in Optimal Mechanism Design
Optimal income taxation and public good provision in a two-class economy
Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy
Public-good provision, mechanism design and voting