Arbeitspapier
Private Provision of a Complementary Public Good
For several years, an increasing number of firms are investing in Open Source Software (OSS). While improvements in such a non-excludable public good cannot be appropriated, companies can benefit indirectly in a complementary proprietary segment. We study this incentive for investment in OSS. In particular we ask how (1) market entry and (2) public investments in the public good affects the firms' production and profits. Surprisingly, we find that there exist cases where incumbents benefit from market entry. Moreover, we show the counter-intuitive result that public spending does not necessarily lead to a decreasing voluntary private contribution.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 134
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- Subject
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Open Source Software
Private Provision of Public Goods
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
Complements
Market Entry
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Schmidtke, Richard
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (where)
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München
- (when)
-
2006
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13417
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13417-5
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schmidtke, Richard
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Time of origin
- 2006