Arbeitspapier
Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees
The democratic accountability of policymaking institutions which are autonomous within delegated mandates has not received as much attention as their independence. We analyze in a theoretical model the effects of accountability in the form of possible overriding of economic policy decisions by the government under different degrees of independence of expert committees conducting monetary and fiscal policy. The equilibrium outcomes of such alternative institution-design frameworks are compared according to key macroeconomic performance criteria. Our results stress the trade-off between anchoring inflation expectations on target and output stabilization that is not solved with accountability.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 07-044
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Subject
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Independence
accountability
monetary policy
fiscal policy
expert committees
institution design
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Mihailov, Alexander
Ullrich, Katrin
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (where)
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Mannheim
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mihailov, Alexander
- Ullrich, Katrin
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Time of origin
- 2007
Other Objects (12)
Independence and accountability of monetary and fiscal policy committees
Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees
Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability
The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability
The European Central Bank: Independence and accountability
The European Central Bank: independence and accountability
Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and central bank independence
Committees and Officers.
Committees and Officers.
Greater independence for fiscal institutions
Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees
Symmetric and asymmetric committees
Independence and accountability of monetary and fiscal policy committees
Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees
Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability
The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability
The European Central Bank: Independence and accountability
The European Central Bank: independence and accountability
Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and central bank independence
Committees and Officers.
Committees and Officers.
Greater independence for fiscal institutions
Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees
Symmetric and asymmetric committees
Independence and accountability of monetary and fiscal policy committees
Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees
Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability
The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability
The European Central Bank: Independence and accountability
The European Central Bank: independence and accountability
Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and central bank independence
Committees and Officers.
Committees and Officers.
Greater independence for fiscal institutions
Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees