Arbeitspapier

The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability

Prosecutors are immensely influential in every judicial system, yet very little is known about the impact of their organization. Here we ask two questions: (1) whether crimes committed by public officials are more likely to be prosecuted when prosecutors are independent, and (2) whether this effect depends on the integrity of the prosecutors themselves. We employ a novel indicator for prosecutorial independence based on data from the World Justice Project to answer these questions. We find that prosecutorial independence favors the prosecution of different types of public officials and this effect is conditional on the level of prosecutorial corruption. For police officers, we find that prosecutorial independence is not decisive, but prosecutorial corruption matters for whether suspected misconduct is likely to be prosecuted.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ILE Working Paper Series ; No. 8

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
Prosecutorial Independence
Prosecutorial Corruption
Government Accountability

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gutmann, Jerg
Voigt, Stefan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)
(wo)
Hamburg
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gutmann, Jerg
  • Voigt, Stefan
  • University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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