Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees

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Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main

Extent: Online-Ressource

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: ZEW Discussion Papers ; 07-044

Classification: Wirtschaft

Keyword: Geldpolitik
Finanzpolitik
Sachverständiger
Selbstverwaltung
Politische Entscheidung
Wirkungsanalyse
Geldpolitik ; Finanzpolitik ; Sachverständiger ; Selbstverwaltung ; Makroökonomie ; Einfluss

Event: Veröffentlichung

(where): Mannheim

(who): Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim

(when): 2007

Creator: Mihailov, Alexander
Ullrich, Katrin

URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-15253

Rights: Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.

Last update: 25.03.2025, 1:54 PM CET

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Associated

Mihailov, Alexander
Ullrich, Katrin
Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim

Time of origin

2007

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Independence and accountability of monetary and fiscal policy committees

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Greater independence for fiscal institutions

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Independence and accountability of monetary and fiscal policy committees

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Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees

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Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability

Arbeitspapier

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The European Central Bank: Independence and accountability

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Committees and Officers.

Kapitel

Committees and Officers.

Konferenzschrift

Greater independence for fiscal institutions

Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees

Arbeitspapier

Symmetric and asymmetric committees

Independence and accountability of monetary and fiscal policy committees

Arbeitspapier

Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees

Arbeitspapier

Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability

Arbeitspapier

The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability

Arbeitspapier

The European Central Bank: Independence and accountability

The European Central Bank: independence and accountability

Buch

Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and central bank independence

Kapitel

Committees and Officers.

Kapitel

Committees and Officers.

Konferenzschrift

Greater independence for fiscal institutions

Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees

Arbeitspapier

Symmetric and asymmetric committees

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Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees

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Time of origin

Other Objects (12)

Independence and accountability of monetary and fiscal policy committees

Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees

Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability

The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability

The European Central Bank: Independence and accountability

The European Central Bank: independence and accountability

Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and central bank independence

Committees and Officers.

Committees and Officers.

Greater independence for fiscal institutions

Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees

Symmetric and asymmetric committees

Independence and accountability of monetary and fiscal policy committees

Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees

Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability

The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability

The European Central Bank: Independence and accountability

The European Central Bank: independence and accountability

Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and central bank independence

Committees and Officers.

Committees and Officers.

Greater independence for fiscal institutions

Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees

Symmetric and asymmetric committees

Independence and accountability of monetary and fiscal policy committees

Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees

Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability

The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability

The European Central Bank: Independence and accountability

The European Central Bank: independence and accountability

Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and central bank independence

Committees and Officers.

Committees and Officers.

Greater independence for fiscal institutions

Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees

Symmetric and asymmetric committees

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