Arbeitspapier

Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees

The democratic accountability of policymaking institutions which are autonomous within delegated mandates has not received as much attention as their independence. We analyze in a theoretical model the effects of accountability in the form of possible overriding of economic policy decisions by the government under different degrees of independence of expert committees conducting monetary and fiscal policy. The equilibrium outcomes of such alternative institution-design frameworks are compared according to key macroeconomic performance criteria. Our results stress the trade-off between anchoring inflation expectations on target and output stabilization that is not solved with accountability.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 07-044

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Thema
Independence
accountability
monetary policy
fiscal policy
expert committees
institution design

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mihailov, Alexander
Ullrich, Katrin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
(wo)
Mannheim
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mihailov, Alexander
  • Ullrich, Katrin
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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