Arbeitspapier
Do Optional Deductibles Reduce the Number of Doctor Visits? – Empirical Evidence with German Data
Deductibles in health insurance are often regarded as a means to contain health care costs when individuals exhibit moral hazard. However, in the absence of moral hazard, voluntarily chosen deductibles may instead lead to self-selection into different insurance contracts. We use a set of new variables in the German Socioeconomic Panel for the years 2002, 2004, and 2006 that measure individual health more accurately and include risk-attitudes towards health in order to determine the price elasticity of demand for health care. A latent class approach that takes into account the panel structure of the data reveals that the effect of deductibles on the number of doctor visits is negligible. Private add-on insurance increases the number of doctor visits. However, altogether the effects of the insurance state on the demand for doctor visits are small in magnitude.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86788-081-7
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 76
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- Thema
-
Health insurance
deductibles
add-on insurance
count data
latent class panel model
Ärzte
Patienten
Nachfrage
Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung
Selbstbeteiligung (Versicherung)
Private Krankenversicherung
Konsumentenverhalten
Schätzung
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schmitz, Hendrik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
- (wo)
-
Essen
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schmitz, Hendrik
- Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Entstanden
- 2008
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