Do Optional Deductibles Reduce the Number of Doctor Visits? – Empirical Evidence with German Data

Arbeitspapier

Deductibles in health insurance are often regarded as a means to contain health care costs when individuals exhibit moral hazard. However, in the absence of moral hazard, voluntarily chosen deductibles may instead lead to self-selection into different insurance contracts. We use a set of new variables in the German Socioeconomic Panel for the years 2002, 2004, and 2006 that measure individual health more accurately and include risk-attitudes towards health in order to determine the price elasticity of demand for health care. A latent class approach that takes into account the panel structure of the data reveals that the effect of deductibles on the number of doctor visits is negligible. Private add-on insurance increases the number of doctor visits. However, altogether the effects of the insurance state on the demand for doctor visits are small in magnitude.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-3-86788-081-7
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 76

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Analysis of Health Care Markets ; Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health ; Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
• Subject: Health insurance ; deductibles ; add-on insurance ; count data ; latent class panel model ; Ärzte ; Patienten ; Nachfrage ; Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung ; Selbstbeteiligung (Versicherung) ; Private Krankenversicherung ; Konsumentenverhalten ; Schätzung ; Deutschland

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schmitz, Hendrik
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
• (where): Essen
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26842
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET