Arbeitspapier
The effects of cartel damage compensations
Damage compensation claims in case of cartels are supposed to increase deterrence, compensate losses and increase efficiency. I show that such claims can instead have adverse effects: If suppliers or buyers of cartelists are compensated in proportion to the profits lost due to the cartel, expected cartel profits can increase. Claims of downstream firms against upstream cartelists who do not monopolize the market increase consumer prices. Suppliers of cartelists can be worse off when eligible to compensation. These results apply also to abuses of dominance and call for a more careful approach towards the private enforcement of competition law.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 13-081
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Law
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
competition law
cartel damage compensation
deterrence
overcharge
private enforcement
vertical relations
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hunold, Matthias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2013
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-349058
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hunold, Matthias
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Entstanden
- 2013
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