Arbeitspapier

Voluntary association in public goods experiments: Reciprocity, mimicry, and efficiency

We study the. Incentive effects of endogenous group formation in a voluntary contributon experiment. Subjects are given information on the past contributions of others and allowed to express a preference for partners. On the basis of the stated preferences new groups are formed. We find that the opportunity to form new groups increases both contributions and efficiency. \Ve also compare the regrouping mechanism with a mechanism allowing targeted reductions of others' earnings („punishmenf“). In the experiment; both mechanisms increase contribution levels significantly, but only endogenous grouping or the combination of the two increase efficiency significantly.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002-19

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Public Goods
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Thema
Puhlic goods
Cüllective action
Group formation
and punishment
Öffentliches Gut
Gruppenentscheidung
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Test
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Page, Talbot
Putterman, Louis
Unel, Bulent
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Brown University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Providence, RI
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Page, Talbot
  • Putterman, Louis
  • Unel, Bulent
  • Brown University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2002

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