Competition of e-commerce intermediaries

Arbeitspapier

In e-commerce, where information collection is essentially costless and geographic location of traders matters very little, fierce competition between providers of similar services is expected. We consider a model where two e-commerce intermediaries (internet shops) compete for sellers. We show that two non-identical shops may coexist in equilibrium if the population of sellers is sufficiently differentiated in their time preferences. In such an equilibrium less patient sellers choose the more popular (with a higher rate of arrival of new buyers) and more expensive shop, while more patient sellers prefer the less popular and cheaper one.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 675

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: e-commerce ; intermediary ; competition ; listing fee ; closing fee ; E-Business ; Informationsbeschaffung ; Internet ; Wettbewerb

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Matros, Alexander ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
• (wo): London
• (wann): 2010

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55203
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ