Competition and Mergers with Strategic Data Intermediaries

Arbeitspapier

We analyze competition between data intermediaries collecting information on consumers, which they sell to firms for price discrimination purposes. We show that competition between data intermediaries benefits consumers by increasing competition between firms, and by reducing the amount of consumer data collected. We argue that merger policy guidelines should investigate the effect of the data strategies of large intermediaries on competition and consumer surplus in related markets.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9339

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General ; Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
• Subject: data ; mergers ; competition ; consumer surplus

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bounie, David ; Dubus, Antoine ; Waelbroeck, Patrick
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/245520
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET