Arbeitspapier
Measuring Quality for Use in Incentive Schemes: The Case of "Shrinkage" Estimators
Researchers commonly “shrink” raw quality measures based on statistical criteria. This paper studies when and how this transformation’s statistical properties would confer economic benefits to a utility-maximizing decisionmaker across common asymmetric information environments. I develop the results for an application measuring teacher quality. The presence of a systematic relationship between teacher quality and class size could cause the data transformation to do either worse or better than the untransformed data. I use data from Los Angeles to confirm the presence of such a relationship and show that the simpler raw measure would outperform the one most commonly used in teacher incentive schemes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7163
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Labor Economics: General
Analysis of Education
Education: Government Policy
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Thema
-
economics of education
empirical contracts
teacher incentive schemes
teacher quality
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Mehta, Nirav
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2018
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Mehta, Nirav
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2018
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