Business interest representation and European Commission fora: A game theoretic investigation

Arbeitspapier

The relationship between business and the EU institutions has evolved from its corporatist origins into a complex elite pluralist arrangement centered around industrial fora and policy committees. We view the growth of forum politics as the direct consequence of the unprecedented boom in economic and public interest lobbying in the early 1990s: While the increase in European interest representation provided greater legitimacy for the European integration program, it put a strain on the existing open pluralist European business-government relationship. One of the European Commission's (EC) informal solutions was to create restricted-entry policy fora and select committees, which it hoped would provide fast and reliable decisionmaking. Employing a formal model of industrial fora and committees, we specify the mechanisms that we believe caused the establishment of the current elite pluralist system of interest representation in the EU. We argue that in the process of establishing selective-entry fora for interest representation, the European Commission acted not only as policy entrepreneur, but also as a political entrepreneur, fostering collective action.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: MPIfG Working Paper ; No. 02/7

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Broscheid, Andreas ; Coen, David
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
• (where): Cologne
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44257
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET