Arbeitspapier
A behavioral account of the labor market: the role of fairness concerns
In this paper, we argue that important labor market phenomena can be better understood if one takes (i) the inherent incompleteness and relational nature of most employment contracts and (ii) the existence of reference-dependent fairness concerns among a substantial share of the population into account. Theory shows and experiments confirm, that even if fairness concerns were only to exert weak effects in one-shot interactions, repeated interactions greatly magnify the relevance of such concerns on economic outcomes. We also review evidence from laboratory and field experiments examining the role of wages and fairness on effort, derive predictions from our approach for entry-level wages and incumbent workers' wages, confront these predictions with the evidence, and show that reference-dependent fairness concerns may have important consequences for the effects of economic policies such as minimum wage laws.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3901
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Microeconomics: General
- Thema
-
Fairness
contracts
wages
effort
experiments
Arbeitsmarkt
Verhaltensökonomik
Gerechtigkeit
Arbeitsvertrag
Lohn
Leistungsmotivation
Test
Interner Arbeitsmarkt
Mindestlohn
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fehr, Ernst
Goette, Lorenz
Zehnder, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009010789
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fehr, Ernst
- Goette, Lorenz
- Zehnder, Christian
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2008
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Abgangszeugnis Ernst Fehr
Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. Evidence and Economic Applications
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories
Fairness and Contract Design
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives
Contracts, fairness, and incentives
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness
Abgangszeugnis Ernst Fehr
Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. Evidence and Economic Applications
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories
Fairness and Contract Design
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives
Contracts, fairness, and incentives
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness
Abgangszeugnis Ernst Fehr
Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications
Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. Evidence and Economic Applications
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories
Fairness and Contract Design
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives
Contracts, fairness, and incentives
Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness