Mergers, Litigation and Efficiency

Arbeitspapier

We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation is inefficient. Even if market concentration and technological disadvantages lead to a significant welfare reduction after merger, from society's perspective the agency's lawsuit may be inefficient. We can show that these inefficiencies may be aggravated if the takeover is hostile.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 185

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Antitrust Law ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
• Subject: hostile takeover ; litigation contest ; merger

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gürtler, Oliver ; Kräkel, Matthias
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2006

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13366
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94089
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13366-2
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET