Mergers, Litigation and Efficiency

Arbeitspapier

We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation is ine? cient. Even if market concentration and technological disadvantages lead to a significant welfare reduction after merger, from society´s perspective the agency´s lawsuit may be ine? cient. We can show that these ine? ciencies may be aggravated if the takeover is hostile.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 22/2006

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Antitrust Law
• Thema: hostile takeover ; litigation contest ; merger

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gürtler, Oliver ; Kräkel, Matthias
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22967
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ