Mergers, Litigation and Efficiency

Arbeitspapier

We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation is ine? cient. Even if market concentration and technological disadvantages lead to a significant welfare reduction after merger, from society´s perspective the agency´s lawsuit may be ine? cient. We can show that these ine? ciencies may be aggravated if the takeover is hostile.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 22/2006

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Antitrust Issues and Policies: General ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Antitrust Law
• Subject: hostile takeover ; litigation contest ; merger

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gürtler, Oliver ; Kräkel, Matthias
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22967
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET