Konferenzbeitrag
Biases in Belief Reports
Belief elicitation is important in many different fields of economic research. We show that how a researcher elicits such beliefs-in particular, whether the belief is about the participant's opponent, an unrelated other, or the population of others-affects the processes involved in the formation of belief reports. We find a clear consensus effect. Yet, when matching the opponent's action would lead to a low payoff and the researcher asks for the belief about this opponent, ex-post rationalization kicks in and beliefs are re-adjusted again. Hence, we recommend to ask about unrelated others or about the population in such cases, as 'opponent beliefs' are even more detached from the beliefs participants had when deciding about their actions in the corresponding game. We find no evidence of a hindsight bias or wishful thinking in any of the treatments.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2021: Climate Economics
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Expectations; Speculations
- Subject
-
Belief Elicitation
Belief Formation
Belief-Action Consistency
Framing Effects
Projection
Consensus Effect
Wishful Thinking
Hindsight Bias
Ex-Post Rationalization
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Bauer, Dominik
Wolff, Irenaeus
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
- (where)
-
Kiel, Hamburg
- (when)
-
2021
- Handle
- Last update
-
12.03.2025, 8:22 PM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Bauer, Dominik
- Wolff, Irenaeus
- ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Time of origin
- 2021
Other Objects (12)
Biases in belief reports
Biases in Beliefs
Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation
Inflation and Deflationary Biases in Inflation Expectations
An Economic Theory of Religious Belief
Case-Based Belief Formation under Ambiguity
The Effect of Belief Elicitation Game Play
Motivated belief updating and rationalization of information
Arbitrage with Production, Collateral Constraint and Heterogeneous Belief
Explicit and Implicit Belief-Based Gender Discrimination: A Hiring Experiment
Disaggregating the drivers of mobile technology adoption: the threat of unobservable gender biases
More Effort with Less Pay: On Information Avoidance, Belief Design, and Performance
Biases in belief reports
Biases in Beliefs
Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation
Inflation and Deflationary Biases in Inflation Expectations
An Economic Theory of Religious Belief
Case-Based Belief Formation under Ambiguity
The Effect of Belief Elicitation Game Play
Motivated belief updating and rationalization of information
Arbitrage with Production, Collateral Constraint and Heterogeneous Belief
Explicit and Implicit Belief-Based Gender Discrimination: A Hiring Experiment
Disaggregating the drivers of mobile technology adoption: the threat of unobservable gender biases
More Effort with Less Pay: On Information Avoidance, Belief Design, and Performance
Biases in belief reports
Biases in Beliefs
Correlation Neglect in Belief Formation
Inflation and Deflationary Biases in Inflation Expectations
An Economic Theory of Religious Belief
Case-Based Belief Formation under Ambiguity
The Effect of Belief Elicitation Game Play
Motivated belief updating and rationalization of information
Arbitrage with Production, Collateral Constraint and Heterogeneous Belief
Explicit and Implicit Belief-Based Gender Discrimination: A Hiring Experiment
Disaggregating the drivers of mobile technology adoption: the threat of unobservable gender biases