Arbeitspapier

Policy deviations, uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice

The implementation of European Union directives into national law is at the discretion of member states. We analyze incentives for member states to deviate from these directives when the European Commission may sue a defecting member state and rulings at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are uncertain. We find that higher uncertainty about the preferences of the ECJ increases policy deviation, irrespective of whether a case is taken to court or not. If decisions of member states to deviate are interdependent, the incidence of field cases decreases while for those policies reaching the ECJ deviations increase.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 09-2013

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Litigation Process
Thema
European Union law
directives
compliance
European Court of Justice
court behavior
uncertainty
legal process
European Commission

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hefeker, Carsten
Neugart, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
(wo)
Marburg
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hefeker, Carsten
  • Neugart, Michael
  • Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Entstanden

  • 2013

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