Arbeitspapier

Policy deviations, uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice

The implementation of European Union directives into national law is at the discretion of member states. We analyze incentives for member states to deviate from these directives when the European Commission may sue a defecting member state and rulings at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are uncertain. We find that higher uncertainty about the preferences of the ECJ increases policy deviation, irrespective of whether a case is taken to court or not. If decisions of member states to deviate are interdependent, the incidence of field cases decreases while for those policies reaching the ECJ deviations increase.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 09-2013

Classification
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Litigation Process
Subject
European Union law
directives
compliance
European Court of Justice
court behavior
uncertainty
legal process
European Commission

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hefeker, Carsten
Neugart, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
(where)
Marburg
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Hefeker, Carsten
  • Neugart, Michael
  • Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Time of origin

  • 2013

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