Arbeitspapier
Policy deviations, uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice
The implementation of European Union directives into national law is at the discretion of member states. We analyze incentives for member states to deviate from these directives when the European Commission may sue a defecting member state and rulings at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are uncertain. We find that higher uncertainty about the preferences of the ECJ increases policy deviation, irrespective of whether a case is taken to court or not. If decisions of member states to deviate are interdependent, the incidence of field cases decreases while for those policies reaching the ECJ deviations increase.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 09-2013
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Litigation Process
- Subject
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European Union law
directives
compliance
European Court of Justice
court behavior
uncertainty
legal process
European Commission
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hefeker, Carsten
Neugart, Michael
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
- (where)
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Marburg
- (when)
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2013
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hefeker, Carsten
- Neugart, Michael
- Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
Time of origin
- 2013