Centralized vs. De-centralized Multinationals and Taxes

Arbeitspapier

The paper examines how country tax differences affect a multinational enterprise's choice to centralize or de-centralize its decision structure. Within a simple model that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs – here, as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument –, we show that (de-)centralized decisions are more profitable when tax differentials are (small) large.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working paper ; No. 10-2005

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; Organization of Production
• Subject: Centralized vs. de-centralized decisions ; taxes ; MNEs

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Nielsen, Søren Bo ; Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis ; Schjelderup, Guttorm
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics
• (where): Frederiksberg
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208503
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET