College admissions with entrance exams: Centralized versus decentralized

Artikel

We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of “centralized college admissions” (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and “decentralized college admissions” (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are supported by a lab experiment designed to test the theory, yet we find a number of differences that render DCA less attractive than CCA compared to the equilibrium benchmark.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: Journal of Economic Theory ; ISSN: 1095-7235 ; Volume: 176 ; Year: 2018 ; Pages: 886-934 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Market Design ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Analysis of Education
• Thema: college admissions ; incomplete information ; student welfare ; contests ; all-pay auctions ; experiment

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hafalir, Isa E. ; Hakimov, Rustamdjan ; Kübler, Dorothea ; Kurino, Morimitsu
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Elsevier ; ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
• (wo): Amsterdam
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.009
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/209667
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ