Arbeitspapier
Tax projections in German states – manipulated by opportunistic incumbent parties?
This paper analyses the accuracy of the tax projections of West German states from a public choice perspective. It argues that state governments have the possibility and face incentives to manipulate tax projections. Evidence for the years 1992 - 2002 reveals a general upward bias in tax projections in election as well as non-election years. The degree of overestimation is higher, the less popular the incumbent party is. Partisanship and elections have no significant influence. To improve external control of state governments in the budget process, the process of tax projections must be made transparent.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Finanzwissenschaftliche Arbeitspapiere ; No. 74
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- Subject
-
tax projections
political parties
budget process
public expenditures
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Bischoff, Ivo
Gohout, Wolfgang
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
- (where)
-
Gießen
- (when)
-
2006
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bischoff, Ivo
- Gohout, Wolfgang
- Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Time of origin
- 2006
Other Objects (12)
Tax projections in German states - manipulated by opportunistic incumbent parties?
Fiscal rules and the opportunistic behaviour of the incumbent politician: evidence from Italian municipalities
Opportunistic Termination
Opportunistic Termination
Captured countryside? Stability and change in sub-national support for African incumbent parties
Incumbency as the major advantage: The electoral advantage for parties of incumbent mayors
Incumbency as the major advantage : The electoral advantage for parties of incumbent mayors
Entry and incumbent innovation
Collaboration in opportunistic networks
OSCAR - the opportunistic scanner
Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investments and the Nature of the Incumbent Firm
Projections
Tax projections in German states - manipulated by opportunistic incumbent parties?
Fiscal rules and the opportunistic behaviour of the incumbent politician: evidence from Italian municipalities
Opportunistic Termination
Opportunistic Termination
Captured countryside? Stability and change in sub-national support for African incumbent parties
Incumbency as the major advantage: The electoral advantage for parties of incumbent mayors
Incumbency as the major advantage : The electoral advantage for parties of incumbent mayors
Entry and incumbent innovation
Collaboration in opportunistic networks
OSCAR - the opportunistic scanner
Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investments and the Nature of the Incumbent Firm
Projections
Tax projections in German states - manipulated by opportunistic incumbent parties?
Fiscal rules and the opportunistic behaviour of the incumbent politician: evidence from Italian municipalities
Opportunistic Termination
Opportunistic Termination
Captured countryside? Stability and change in sub-national support for African incumbent parties
Incumbency as the major advantage: The electoral advantage for parties of incumbent mayors
Incumbency as the major advantage : The electoral advantage for parties of incumbent mayors
Entry and incumbent innovation
Collaboration in opportunistic networks
OSCAR - the opportunistic scanner
Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investments and the Nature of the Incumbent Firm