Arbeitspapier

Fiscal rules and the opportunistic behaviour of the incumbent politician: evidence from Italian municipalities

Previous studies on electoral competition show that fiscal variables are manipulated by incumbent politicians in order to be re-elected. This phenomenon has been addressed by the literature on electoral budget cycle and, in a decentralised economy, by the literature on yardstick competition. Our objective is to consider the effect of the introduction of a fiscal rule on the opportunistic behaviour of incumbent politicians. We conduct a panel data analysis on the current expenditures of 246 Italian municipalities. The introduction of the domestic stability pact (DSP) seems to change the electoral cycle, by increasing the magnitude of the expenditures during pre-electoral periods. Moreover, our results show that municipalities affected by the DSP are more sensitive to changes in neighbouring jurisdictions' fiscal policies, during pre-electoral periods. We conclude that the introduction of the DSP, besides significantly reducing the level of local public spending, strengthens the opportunistic behaviour of incumbent politicians in pre-electoral years.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2605

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Thema
Fiscal rules
electoral budget cycle
yardstick competition
system GMM
spatial econometrics
Kommunale Finanzpolitik
Regelgebundene Politik
Politischer Konjunkturzyklus
Kommunalpolitik
Opportunismus
Yardstick Competition
Italien

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bartolini, David
Santolini, Raffaella
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bartolini, David
  • Santolini, Raffaella
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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