Artikel
A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities
A generalization of transferable utility cooperative games from the functional forms introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior) and Lucas and Thrall (1963, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 10, 281-298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The definition of the core is adapted analogously and the possibilities for the cross-cutting of contractual arrangements are illustrated and discussed.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 5 ; Year: 2014 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 191-203 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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cooperative games
core
externalities
multiple membership
stability
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Nax, Heinrich H.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2014
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g5040191
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Nax, Heinrich H.
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2014
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